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Abstract
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fire the worker and automate the task. In our model, an automation-augmenting
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1 Introduction
In the last five decades, total hours worked and employment rose in developed coun-
tries, despite the ubiquitous fall in the labor share. This employment growth looks
staggering as it coexisted with the emergence of new technologies that automate pro-
duction and are supposed to displace labor. But a meticulous look at the effect of
these new technologies – namely, automation – shows that they have actually favored
employment growth: Autor and Salomons (2018) and Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn
(2018) document that these new technologies have created more jobs than they have
destroyed.1 In this paper, we ask: will automation always create more jobs than it de-
stroys or can we expect a different future?
To answer this question, we build a theoretical model that satisfies two criteria.
First, in order to be consistent with the past, an automation-augmenting shock – a
shock that increases the productivity of allmachines/robots – is able to reduce the labor
share and simultaneously increase employment. And, second, in order to be insightful
about how the future may differ from the past, the model is flexible enough to generate
different outcomes from the same sort of shocks. In the literature, among the models
that explain the fall in the labor share, none offers a qualitatively flexible response of
employment. In these models, either employment always falls (Caballero and Ham-
mour, 1998; Zeira, 1998; Hornstein, Krusell and Violante, 2007; Prettner and Strulik,
2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018) or employment always increases (Guimara˜es and
Gil, 2019).2 Our model borrows several features from these models to offer a frame-
work that is consistent with the past and insightful about potential future scenarios.
In our model, an automation-augmenting shock reduces the labor share but may both
increase or catastrophically reduce employment.
The narrative and assumptions of our model broadly agree with those in Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2018). In our model, labor has a comparative advantage in producing
new and complex tasks and, thus, new firms tend to invest in, what we call, themanual
1Autor and Salomons (2018) study the effect of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks on employment
using data onmultiple industries for 18 OECD countries since 1970. Their results indicate that TFP shocks
directly displace employment in the sectors in which it originates but this direct effect of TFP is more than
outweighed by indirect employment gains in other sectors. Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn (2018), on the
other hand, analyze the effects on employment of a more specific type of innovation: routine-replacing
technological change (RRTC) in Europe from 1999 to 2010. Still, their findings are very similar to the ones
by Autor and Salomons: the direct effect of RRTC has been to significantly reduce employment (about 1.6
million jobs) but these effects have been offset by the indirect effects of RRTC. They conclude that RRTC
has increased employment by about 1.5 million jobs. Furthermore, these two papers contrast with the
approach in, e.g., Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019b), who find that robot adoption depresses employment
and wages at the commuting-zone level. Yet, Acemoglu and Restrepo abstract from the indirect effects of
robot adoption in one commuting zone on the other commuting zones that may render a positive effect
of robot adoption at the aggregate level. Thus, Acemoglu and Restrepo abstract from the indirect positive
effects estimated by Autor and Salomons and Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn.
2These models do not propose the samemechanism or shock to explain the fall in the labor share. But
irrespective of themechanism, they predict robust directions for employment after the shock that reduces
the labor share.
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technology and produce using only labor. Machines, however, tend to catch upwith la-
bor in producing tasks. Every period, some workers lose their comparative advantage,
motivating their employers to fire them and automate the production of the tasks. In
this case, firms move to, what we call, the automated technology and produce using
only machines/robots.3
Yet, to properly take into account the idiosyncrasies of the labor market, we funda-
mentally deviate from Acemoglu and Restrepo and build a model with matching fric-
tions based on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides setup. This allows us to realistically
model the long-term firm-worker relationship and bring us closer to Hornstein, Krusell
and Violante (2007) and to our previous work in Guimara˜es and Gil (2019).4 We, how-
ever, depart from our previous work by assuming that jobs are endogenously destroyed
as firms continuously contrast their value using the manual technology and the option
to move to the automated technology. In this sense, our model is closer to Hornstein,
Krusell and Violante because they also endogenize job destruction.5 Yet, our model
and focus also differ from theirs in important aspects. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante
build a model with vintage capital to study capital-embodied technological change.
We, on the other hand, consider the dichotomy of manual and automated technolo-
gies to study automation-augmenting shocks.
Our assumptions imply that automation-augmenting shocks affect employment by
changing both job creation and job destruction. This is an important deviation from
the literature that assumes flexible labor markets, which cannot offer insights regard-
ing how the flows in the labor market react to shocks and determine employment fluc-
tuations. And it is precisely this deviation from the literature that lends our model its
flexibility regarding the impact of automation-augmenting shocks on employment.
In all our calibrations, job creation and job destruction increase after an automation-
augmenting shock. Job destruction increases because the shock makes it more prof-
itable to invest in the automated technology and so more firms destroy jobs and au-
tomate production. Job creation increases because of one or a combination of two
mechanisms. First, as in Guimara˜es and Gil (2019), an automation-augmenting shock
increases job creation if firms can choose technology at the time of entry andfirm-entry
corresponds to an undirected-technological-search process (as in, e.g., Benhabib, Perla
3By allowing firms to choose whether to invest in the manual or in the automated technology, our
model relates to a long literature of technology choice that we review more extensively in Guimara˜es and
Gil (2019). In our model and in several contributions within this literature, the technology choice de-
pends explicitly on a firm-specific (or task-specific) exogenous feature (e.g., Zeira, 1998, 2010; Acemoglu
and Zilibotti, 2001; Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018; Alesina, Battisti and Zeira, 2018; and
Guimara˜es and Gil, 2019). This feature then determines, ceteris paribus, the firm’s overall productivity or
cost level using each technology.
4In this regard, our paper is also close to Cords and Prettner (2019) and Leduc and Liu (2019). The for-
mer build amodel withmatching frictions to study how an increase in the stock of robots affects low- and
high-skill employment. The latter build a DSGE model with matching frictions to study how automation
affects the ciclicality of the labor share.
5To model endogenous job destruction, we particularly rely on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and
Pissarides (2000, Ch. 2).
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and Tonetti, 2017). Second, automation-augmenting shocks also promote job creation
through an alternative mechanism in our model. Because firms are forward-looking
and new tasks tend to be produced by workers, firms have a higher incentive to hire a
worker upon entry in anticipation of the greater profits when they automate produc-
tion post-entry.6
Even though both flows increase after an automation-augmenting shock, their ab-
solute and relative magnitudes crucially depend on the calibration of the model. In
some calibrations, job creation increases more than job destruction, thereby raising
employment. In other calibrations, the opposite occurs and employment falls. The
relative magnitudes of the changes in the flows depend crucially on one parameter,
which we interpret as a feature intrinsic to each task controlling for how rapidly work-
ers may lose their comparative advantage in producing it. In slow-changing environ-
ments, in which the comparative advantage of labor in producing each task is relatively
stable, job destruction barely shifts after the automation-augmenting shock. In these
conditions, job creation increases more than job destruction. Nonetheless, in rapid-
changing environments, an automation-augmenting shock leads to massive job de-
struction. This jump in job destruction is not followed by an equal jump in job creation
because the increase in labor market tightness makes it more costly to find the right
worker and allows workers to demand higher wages. In these scenarios, employment
catastrophically drops. These results show how our model can both agree and disagree
with the facts documented by Autor and Salomons (2018) and Gregory, Salomons and
Zierahn (2018). Thus, our paper conveys an important message: if current and future
jobs are made of tasks in which workers rapidly lose their comparative advantage, then
automation-augmenting shocks may have dramatically different consequences in the
future.
We also try to dissect the mechanism behind our results and we confirm that the
increase in wages after the automation-augmenting shock plays a very important role.
In tighter labor markets (as observed in our model after the shock), workers demand
higher wages for two reasons. One is that the outside option of manual firms of look-
ing for an alternative worker is more costly and another is that workers can easily find
other jobs. When we counterfactually assume that wages are orthogonal to labor mar-
ket tightness (and to the productivity of the automated technology), job creation is seri-
ously magnified to the point that employment increases for a much wider range of cal-
ibrations. Employment does, however, still fall in quite rapid-changing environments
because matching frictions also play their role. If job creation increases, it becomes
harder to find a worker suitable for the job, which increases costs and discourages fur-
ther job creation. Job destruction, on the other hand, is not much affected bymatching
frictions and increases significantly in quite rapid-changing environments, leading to
the net fall in employment.
6UBER’s Initial Public Offering prospectus offers a good example of this channel. The prospectus as-
sumes that developing autonomous vehicles importantly contributes to the current valuation of the firm
by potentially allowing it to reduce their labor demand in the future. Thus, the possibility of automating
tasks in the future contributes to UBER’s investment and recruitment in the present.
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We consider two other variants of our model to further dissect the mechanism. In
one variant, we deviate from the typical assumption in models with matching frictions
that workers must stay nonemployed for at least a period after losing their jobs. This
reduces the prevalence of matching frictions and increases the pool of available work-
ers for firms investing in the manual technology. We find that relaxing this assumption
does promote greater employment but we also find that it does not havemuch quanti-
tative impact.
In another variant, we consider the implications of, what we call, human touch.
Even though both workers and machines can execute the same task, consumers may
deem tasks executed by humans andbymachines differently due to the relevance of the
human touch. A simple case is the one of sellers and vending machines. Both broadly
sell (they perform the same task) but consumers do not necessarily find the same task
performed by one or the other perfect substitutes. In the scenario in which they are
imperfect substitutes, a widespread use of machines increases the price of the tasks
produced by workers relative to the price of the tasks produced by machines, which
largely reduces job destruction but barely changes job creation. Thus, if many of the
tasks produced in the economy are directed to consumers and they find the differenti-
ated human touch relevant, then an automation-augmenting shock is unlikely to catas-
trophically reduce employment.
Our paper also relates to Prettner and Strulik (2017), Basso and Jimeno (2018), Berg,
Buffie and Zanna (2018), and Caselli and Manning (2019) (and again with Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2018) in that these papers also assess how automation-related shocks
may affect either wages or employment in the future. Prettner and Strulik build a life-
cyclemodel in whichmachines complement high-skill labor but substitute low-skill la-
bor. They conclude that innovation asymptotically increases automation and inequal-
ity. And in an extension, they show that innovation always reduces low-skill employ-
ment due to greater automation and the high costs of acquiring skills for some work-
ers. Basso and Jimeno assess the effect of demographical changes in a life-cycle model
in which R&D investment may be directed to innovation (new tasks) or automation
(of current tasks). They conclude that the demographic transition in the United States
and Europe promoted higher wages in the beginning of 2000’s but lower wages after-
wards. Berg, Buffie and Zanna build a model with a nested CES (constant-elasticity of
substitution) production function in which standard capital complements a compos-
ite of labor and robots; this composite assumes that labor and robots are substitutes.
They conclude that robot-augmenting shocks can only benefit labor in the very long
run. Caselli and Manning study how innovation affects real wages in economies with
constant returns to scale, constant real interest rate, and multiple types of labor. They
conclude that averagewages increase as long as the price of capital falls more than that
of consumption goods. Under this condition, they also conclude that all wages increase
if the supply of labor types is perfectly elastic. But their model, as well as the models
in Basso and Jimeno and Berg, Buffie and Zanna, abstracts from the impacts of shocks
on employment as labor supply is assumed inelastic. More generally, our model differs
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from all these models because they assume perfectly competitive labor markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start by detailing our model
in Section 2. In Section 3, we calibrate our model and study numerically the effects of
automation-augmenting shocks. In Section 4, we dissect the mechanisms underlying
our results, including the role of the human touch. In Section 5, we conclude.
2 TheModel
In the model, the aggregate output is the sum of the production of a number of tasks,
which can be produced by one of two technologies: an automated technology and a
manual technology. At the time of entry, a firmmust first create a task, which amounts
to an entry cost denoted by Ω. If the firm produces the task using the automated tech-
nology, it must pay an additional κK , which can be interpreted as a robot investment. If
the firm produces the task using the manual technology, it must pay an additional κL
µ(θ)
to match with a worker and it must bargain wages with the worker.7
Entering firms that choose the manual technology must search for workers in the
labor market. A Cobb-Douglas matching function determines the number of matches
between these firms and the workers that were nonemployed at the beginning of the
period.8 This matching function has constant returns to scale, has as argument labor
market tightness, θ, is scaled by matching efficiency, χ > 0, and has an elasticity with
respect to nonemployed workers of 0 < η < 1. Thus, we write the job-filling probability
and the job-finding probability as, respectively, µ(θ) ≡ χθ−η and f(θ) ≡ χθ1−η.
Each task has a stochastic idiosyncratic productivity, z, in the interval [zmin, z¯] ac-
cording to a probability distribution function G(z). Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) as-
sume thatworkers have a comparative advantage in producingmore productive (higher-
indexed) tasks. We borrow this assumption and assume that the manual technology
produces zLz units of the task, while (as a normalization) the automated technology
produces zK units of the task. Thus, z represents the comparative advantage of work-
ers in producing the respective task, so that highly-productive tasks (high z) tend to
be produced by the manual technology and less-productive tasks with the automated
technology.
Firms’ technological choice depends on the task’s idiosyncratic productivity, z. In
Figure 1, we summarize the timeline of how z affects the distribution of firms between
the technologies. In Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), labor has the highest compara-
tive advantage in producing new tasks because newly created tasks have the highest
7Our setup thus assumes the extreme case of a technology that only uses labor and a technology that
only uses capital/robots. We share this convenient assumption with, e.g., Zeira (1998, Sec. 7; 2010), Ace-
moglu and Restrepo (2018), Alesina, Battisti and Zeira (2018), and Guimara˜es and Gil (2019).
8The workers that lose their jobs (either exogenously or endogenously) do not produce for at least a
period. This agrees with the evidence in Hall and Kudlyak (2019).
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Figure 1: Timing of technological constrains and technology choice
index. We assume a more general environment. Of the number of new tasks created
each period, a proportion 1−λe has the highest productivity, z¯, and, thus, workers have
the maximum comparative advantage. In this case and in equilibrium, firms choose
the manual technology and produce zLz¯ units of the task. Conversely, a proportion λe
of new tasks have their productivity drawn from the distribution G(z) of productivity
levels over the interval [zmin, z¯] and firms choose technology according to the present-
discounted values of the technologies. Producing tasks with higher z is more profitable
if the firm uses the manual technology to take advantage of the higher workers’ com-
parative advantage. As a result, there is an idiosyncratic productivity cutoff, denoted by
z∗e , above which firms prefer the manual technology and below which firms prefer the
automated technology at the time of entry.
Firms that start production using the manual technology can move to the auto-
mated technology in later periods. Their technological choice depends on how the
task’s idiosyncratic productivity, z, evolves over time. If it becomes too low, manual
firms prefer to destroy the job and automate the production of the task. This line of
events further echoes the setting in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018). In their model,
tasks previously performed by labor can be automated as the tasks’ (relative) produc-
tivity falls due to the expansion of the technological frontier over time and the implied
gradual obsolescence of existingmanual tasks. We also find a similar mechanism in the
model of Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007). They build a model in which a unit of
vintage capital is matched with a worker. As technology evolves, firms that use the old-
est vintage of capital prefer to scrap their capital and, as in our model, destroy the job.
Yet, in themodels of both Acemoglu and Restrepo andHornstein, Krusell and Violante,
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the fall in the task’s idiosyncratic productivity (relative to the technology frontier) is de-
terministic while, in our model, we assume it to be stochastic.9 Tomodel the evolution
of z, we build on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). After production takes place, a pro-
portion 1− λn of manual firms sees no change in their tasks’ idiosyncratic productivity
and, thus, in their position relative to the technology frontier, z¯. But a proportion λn of
manual firms redraws the task’s idiosyncratic productivity from the same distribution
G(z) of productivity levels. If the new idiosyncratic productivity, z, is too low – below
the cutoff, which we denote by z∗ – themanual firm fires the worker and shifts from the
manual to the automated technology.10 As a result, λn controls for how rapidly workers
lose their comparative advantage, which directly affects job destruction.
These assumptions imply that shocks to the economy can change the employment
rate by affecting both job creation and job destruction. Thus, this setting allows for a
rich environment to study how automation-augmenting (rise in zK) shocks affect the
employment rate.
In writing the equations below, we omit the time subscripts as we are only inter-
ested in steady-states. Yet, within a period, there is an order of events that we must
further clarify before laying out the equations. 1) New firms pay Ω to create a task and
enter the market until a free-entry condition is satisfied. 2) A proportion λe of new
firms and a proportion λn of manual firms (re)draw the task’s idiosyncratic produc-
tivity, z. 3) Depending on the productivity draw, z, and anticipating wage bargaining,
firms decide which technology to use in the following period. If an incumbent manual
firm decides to automate the production of the task, it must fire the worker, pay κK ,
and wait a period to resume production. 4) Production takes place and manual firms
bargain wages with their workers. 5) A proportion δL of the tasks produced by active
(producing within the period) manual firms and a proportion δK of the tasks produced
by active automated firms are exogenously destroyed.
2.1 Firms
An active firm using the manual technology to produce a task with idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity z has the following present-discounted value JL(z):
JL(z) = zLz − w(z) + β(1− δL)
{
(1− λn)JL(z) + λn
[
G(z∗)(βJK − κK) +
∫ z¯
z∗
JL(z)dG(z)
]}
, (1)
where we assume a discount factor of β. This firm produces zLz units of the task (and,
thus, of the output) and pays the wage w(z) to its worker. There is a probability 1 − δL
that it will keep producing in the following period. And if it does produce, its value
9We assume it to be stochastic for two reasons. One is that it is a convenient assumption that does
not demand us to keep track of how far or close a task is from being automated. The other, and more
important, is that tasksmay differ on the speed at which they are automated; thus, we find itmore realistic
to assume that the transition frommanual to automated is random rather than deterministic.
10Naturally, some firms also draw a higher z. We can interpret this as a form of technological catching
up of the task. In any case, the most relevant aspect for the mechanism of the model is that these firms
remain manual.
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remains unchanged with a probability 1 − λn and changes due to the redraw of the
idiosyncratic productivity, z, with a probability λn. Those that draw a productivity
below z∗ prefer to fire the worker and change to the automated technology; in this
case, because they already paid Ω and it takes one period to shift technologies, their
value equals the discounted value of the automated technology, βJK , reduced of the
technology-specific cost κK . If they draw a productivity above z
∗, they choose to main-
tain themanual technology; in this case, their value equals the unconditional expected
value of the manual technology between z∗ and z¯. This intuitively implies that z∗ is
determined by the following indifference condition:
JL(z
∗) = βJK − κK . (2)
The present-discounted value of the automated technology, JK , is much simpler as
its productivity is constant:
JK = zK + β(1 − δK)JK . (3)
At the time of entry, all firms pay Ω to create a new task. A proportion λe of the new
firms draws the task’s idiosyncratic productivity; the other firms start with the manual
technology with idiosyncratic productivity z¯. Among the firms that draw idiosyncratic
productivity, a proportion G(z∗e ) chooses the automated technology and the remaining
firms choose the manual technology. These assumptions allow us to write the free-
entry condition in our model:
λe
[
G(z∗e ) (βJK − κK) +
∫ z¯
z∗e
(
βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ)
)
dG(z)
]
+ (1− λe)
(
βJL(z¯)−
κL
µ(θ)
)
= Ω,
(4)
where the present-discounted values, JK and JL(z), are discounted by β because it
takes one period for firms to start production. New firms that draw productivity are
only indifferent between either technology if their values net of the technology-specific
entry cost are equal. This occurs when the task’s idiosyncratic productivity equals z∗e :
βJL(z
∗
e )−
κL
µ(θ)
= βJK − κK . (5)
2.2 Workers
In our model, there is a unit measure of risk-neutral workers who are either employed
or nonemployed. The lifetime income of an employed worker is given by E(z):
E(z) = w(z) + β
{
(1− δL)
[
(1− λn)E(z) + λn
(
G(z∗)U +
∫ z¯
z∗
E(z)dG(z)
)]
+ δLU
}
.
(6)
E(z) increases with the wage w(z), which varies with the idiosyncratic productivity of
the task the worker is producing at the firm. E(z) falls with the probability that the job
is exogenously destroyed and the worker is back to nonemployment. In this case, the
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lifetime income is given by U . E(z) also changes with the future productivity draw of
the firm: if the new productivity draw is low – below z∗ –, the firm fires the worker and
the lifetime income returns to U ; if the new productivity draw exceeds z∗, then wages
change, shifting the lifetime income of employment.
If nonemployed, a worker enjoys income b ≥ 0 and finds a job with a probability
f(θ). In equilibrium, nonemployed workers only matchwith new firms to produce new
tasks. But new tasks vary in idiosyncratic productivity. A proportion 1−λe of new tasks
start with idiosyncratic productivity z¯ and, thus, are produced by labor. On the other
hand, a proportion λe of new tasks have their idiosyncratic productivity drawn from
G(z) and the firms producing the tasks only hire a worker if the draw exceeds z∗e . As a
result, we write the lifetime income of a nonemployed worker as
U = b+ β
{
f(θ)
[
(1− λe)E(z¯) +
λe
1−G(z∗e )
∫ z¯
z∗e
E(z)dG(z)
]
+ (1− f(θ))U
}
. (7)
2.3 Wage Bargaining
Workers and firms bargain over wages such that the bargained wage maximizes the
Nash product:
w(z) = argmax [E(z) − U ]φ
[
JL(z)−max
(
βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ)
, βJK − κK
)]1−φ
, (8)
where the parameter 0 < φ < 1 measures the worker’s bargaining power. A firm that
employs a worker has two outside options. It may fire the worker and look for a new
one, which generates a value of βJL(z) −
κL
µ(θ) .
11 Alternatively, it may fire the worker
and adopt the automated technology, which generates a value of βJK − κK . We infer
that there is an idiosyncratic productivity cutoff thatmakes themanual firm indifferent
between the two outside options, which turns out to be the same as the entry cutoff, z∗e ,
in Eq. (5). Thus, we summarize the solution to Nash bargaining as
E(z)− U =
φ
1− φ
[
JL(z)−
(
βJL(z) −
κL
µ(θ)
)]
if z¯ > z ≥ z∗e ; (9)
E(z)− U =
φ
1− φ
[JL(z)− (βJK − κK)] if zmin < z < z
∗
e . (10)
In both cases, workers retain a proportion φ of the surplus, which is an increasing func-
tion of the idiosyncratic productivity, z, only due to JL(z). As a result, wages increase
with z but less than proportionately. Eq. (9), for example, implies that wages increase in
proportion
φ(1−β)
φ(1−β)+1−φ < 1 of zLz. This confirms our anticipation that greater idiosyn-
cratic productivity implies greater profits, guaranteeing that only the least productive
11Importantly, since the productivity z is idiosyncratic, it implies that if firms decide to look for another
worker, they do not have to redraw productivity. This prevents workers from capturing a large share of the
surplus generated by greater productivity.
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firms in using the manual technology prefer to use the automated technology.
Given Nash bargaining, job destruction only occurs when the surplus of the match
is negative; thus, both workers and firms deem it optimal to destroy the job. The sur-
plus of thematch is only negative if it is less profitable for the firm to stay in themanual
technology than to move to the automated technology, which occurs when JL(z) <
βJK−κK . In other words, all firms that draw the task’s idiosyncratic productivity below
the cutoff z∗, fire the worker and move to the automated technology. Simultaneously,
when the task’s idiosyncratic productivity is too low, workers prefer to move to nonem-
ployment than to stay employed and earn a low wage because E(z) < U . Thus, the
cutoff z∗ satisfiesE(z∗) = U or, equivalently, Eq. (2).
2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is defined at the aggregate level of the economy and is
characterized by the vector (θ, z∗, z∗e , w(z)), which satisfies the free-entry condition, Eq.
(4), and the two indifference conditions, Eqs. (2) and (5), and solves Nash bargaining.
2.4.1 Employment Rate and Number of Firms
We define employment as the number of workers employed at the time of production.
As usual, in equilibrium, employment is determined by the balance between the flows
from employment to nonemployment and the flows from nonemployment to employ-
ment. Using n to denote the employment rate, the flows from nonemployment to em-
ployment sumup to f(θ)(1−n): a proportion f(θ) of the nonemployed workers, (1−n),
find jobs every period. The flows from employment to nonemployment take two forms
because workers may lose their jobs exogenously and endogenously. There is a proba-
bility δL that employed workers lose their jobs for exogenous reasons. From those that
do not lose their jobs for exogenous reasons, there is a probability λn that the produc-
tivity of the task changes. And there is a probability G(z∗) that the new productivity is
below the cutoff z∗, leading the firm to move to the automated technology and fire the
worker. Thus, after some algebra, we get an equilibrium employment rate of
n =
f(θ)
f(θ) + δL + (1− δL)λnG(z∗)
. (11)
Because every manual firm employs one worker, n also represents the number of
manual firms. But the number of firms that use the automated technology is more in-
tricate: some firms immediately choose the automated technology; others start with
the manual technology and then move to the automated technology. We start by mea-
suring the former. First, only a proportion λe of new firms can choose technologies.
Second, if the firms can choose technology, they only choose the automated technol-
ogy if the idiosyncratic productivity is below the cutoff z∗e ; this occurs with a probability
G(z∗e ). Third, the proportion of those that enter and choose the manual technology is
λe(1−G(z
∗
e )) + 1− λe, which corresponds to the number of firms choosing the manual
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technology: f(θ)(1 − n). Thus, every period, there is λeG(z
∗
e )
λe(1−G(z∗e ))+1−λe
f(θ)(1 − n) firms
that start production immediately using the automated technology.
Now we measure the other source of automated firms: those that start with the
manual technology and change technology. To measure this, we must determine the
number of firms that endogenously fire their workers every period. Given that there
are n manual firms, there is a probability δL that the job is exogenously destroyed,
there is a probability λn that the productivity of the task changes, and there is a prob-
ability G(z∗) that a firm that redraws productivity moves to the automated technol-
ogy, then the number of firms that automate the production of their respective tasks is
(1− δL)λnG(z
∗)n.
Additionally, denoting nK as the stock of automated firms, there are δKnK auto-
mated firms destroyed every period. Thus, there are
nK =
(1− δL)λnG(z
∗)
δK
n+
λeG(z∗e )
λe(1−G(z∗e ))+1−λe
δK
f(θ)(1− n) (12)
automated firms.
2.4.2 Output and the Labor Share
To quantify output, we only need to sum the output produced by manual and auto-
mated firms because we assume that tasks are perfect substitutes. The output of auto-
mated firms is zKnK as all these firms produce zK . But it is not as simple to determine
the output of manual firms because they are not distributed according to G(z) from z∗
to z¯. To measure output, we need to distinguish between three groups of manual firms:
we need to calculate howmanymanual firms produce tasks with productivity (i) z¯ from
themoment theywere created and havenot redrawn productivity afterwards, (ii) above
z∗e (bymeans of draws or redraws of z), and (iii) between z
∗ and z∗e (bymeans of redraws
of z). We denote the latter two as n∗e and n
∗, respectively. And we obtain the number of
firms producing tasks with productivity z¯ from inception as the residual: n− n∗e − n
∗.
There are two ways in which a manual firm may produce a task with idiosyncratic
productivity above z∗e and belong to n
∗
e: either the productivity of the task was drawn
at the time of entry or it was later redrawn in the interval [z∗e , z¯]. The number of man-
ual firms that draw productivity at the time of entry is
λe(1−G(z∗e ))
λe(1−G(z∗e ))+1−λe
f(θ)(1− n). This
follows from two factors. First, every period, f(θ)(1− n) newmanual firms are created.
Second, these firms split between those that do not draw productivity (in proportion
1 − λe of all new firms) and those that draw productivity and prefer the manual tech-
nology (in proportion λe(1−G(z
∗
e )) of all new firms). Furthermore, the number ofman-
ual firms that redraw productivity and obtain z above z∗e is (1 − δL)λn(1 −G(z
∗
e )) given
that a proportion 1 − δL of manual firms survive exogenous shocks and a proportion
λn redraw productivity. But some of these firms were already included in n
∗
e; thus, the
net inflow of firms by redrawing productivity into n∗e is only (1−δL)λn(1−G(z
∗
e ))(n−n
∗
e).
AUTOMATION &MATCHING FRICTIONS 13
There are also two ways in which a manual firm leaves n∗e: either the firm ends ex-
ogenously or it draws productivity below z∗e . These exit flows sum to δL+(1−δL)λnG(z
∗
e ).
Combining the flows into and out of n∗e implies after a few derivations:
n∗e =
(1− δL)λn(1−G(z
∗
e ))n
δL + (1− δL)λn
+
λe(1−G(z∗e ))f(θ)(1−n)
λe(1−G(z∗e ))+1−λe
δL + (1− δL)λn
. (13)
We can apply a similar logic to find the firms that produce tasks with idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity between z∗ and z∗e . Making the necessary adjustments and taking into ac-
count that no firm starts in the manual technology with productivity between z∗ and
z∗e , we obtain
n∗ =
(1− δL)λn
δL + (1− δL)λn
(G(z∗e )−G(z
∗))n. (14)
Having established the number of firms, we quantify output as
y = nKzK + (n− n
∗ − n∗e)zLz¯ + n
∗
e
1
1−G(z∗e )
∫ z¯
z∗e
zdG(z) + n∗
1
G(z∗e )−G(z
∗)
∫ z∗e
z∗
zdG(z),
(15)
in which we multiply the number of firms in each group by its respective average out-
put. The labor share then is ratio of the number of workers in each group of manual
firms (recall that every manual firm employs one worker) multiplied by its respective
average wage relative to output:
LS =
(n− n∗ − n∗e)w(z¯) + n
∗
e
1
1−G(z∗e )
∫ z¯
z∗e
w(z)dG(z) + n∗ 1
G(z∗e )−G(z
∗)
∫ z∗e
z∗
w(z)dG(z)
y
.
(16)
3 Results
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate themodel to monthly US data and summarize our benchmark calibration
in Table 1. We set β = 0.996, which implies an annual discount rate of 4.91%. We
follow Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and set η = 0.5. We also set φ = 0.5. In our
model, firms draw the task’s idiosyncratic productivity from a uniform distribution, i.e.,
G(z) = z−zmin
z¯−zmin
, in which z¯ = 0.25 and zmin = 0.15.
12 To calibrate b, we assume it is 70%
of the productivity of the firm that draws z = zmin +
z¯+zmin
2 . This is similar to what
we find inmany studies in the literature (including Hall andMilgrom (2008), Pissarides
12This implies that themost productivemanual firms are 67%more productive than the least productive
manual firms, which is slightly below the empirical estimates in, e.g, Syverson (2011) and OECD (2017) for
all firms in manufacturing. Yet, if λe > 0, some of the firms that enter the market choose the automated
technology and our calibration generally implies that zK is much lower than zLzmin. Furthermore, we
abstract from workers’ skill differences and assortative matching, which can exacerbate the estimated
firms’ productivity differences.
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(2009), and Coles and Kelishomi (2018)) that assume that b ≈ 0.7zL in models with
homogeneous firms.
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration
Discount factor: β = 0.996
Matching function elasticity: η = 0.5
Workers’ bargaining power: φ = 0.5
Minimum productivity draw: zmin = 0.15
Maximum productivity draw: z¯ = 0.25
Nonemployment income: b = 0.7zL
(
zmin +
z¯+zmin
2
)
Rate of automated-firm destruction: δK = 0.01
Cost of Capital/Robot: κK = 0.01
Job-filling Cost: κL = 0.01
Matching Efficiency: χ = 0.1
To calibrate the exogenous probability of manual firm destruction, δL, we impose
that the steady-state probability that a firm-worker match breaks equals the average
job destruction rate in the US from 1948 to 2010 (Shimer, 2012); thus JD ≡ δL + (1 −
δL)λnG(z
∗) = 0.036. For the automated technology, we assume it is δK = 0.01. We do
not impose any particular value for λe and λn; instead we analyze how different values
of these two parameters change our results. To increase the range of λe and λn, we set
κK = 0.01. We also arbitrarily set κL = 0.01 and χ = 0.1, but run sensitivity analysis.
Finally, we set zL, zK , and Ω such that our steady-state matches three targets. We
target the prime-age (aged 25-54) workers’ employment rate and the labor share in the
US from 1977 until 2018;13 this implies that n = 0.78 and LS = 0.61. We also target
G(z∗e ) = 0.5 such that half of the productivity draws exceed the entry cutoff. But, since
this target is arbitrarily set, we run sensitivity analysis on this target.
3.2 Employment: Is the Future like the Past?
Looking into the last four decades, recent empirical studies on the effects of TFP and
routine-replacing technological shocks point to a net increase in employment (e.g., Au-
tor and Salomons, 2018; Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn, 2018). These studies docu-
ment that the direct labor-displacing (job destruction) effect has been outweighed by
indirect effects that ultimately lead to job creation. But do these results hold under all
circumstances? In other words, can the future be different? To answer this question,
we assess the effects of an automation-augmenting shock under various calibrations
of our model. We conclude that our results are highly dependent on the calibration:
13We target the employment rate of prime-age workers because our model abstracts from demographic
changes.
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Figure 2: The effect of higher zK under λe = 1 and different values of λn
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Note: This figure shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock in the case in which all firms
draw the tasks’ productivity at the time of entry, λe = 1, and for different probabilities that this pro-
ductivity changes, λn. The left-panel shows the percentage change in employment, n. The right-
panel shows the percentage change in the job-finding rate, f(θ), and in the job-destruction rate,
JD ≡ δL + (1− δL)λnG(z
∗). The shock to zK is of 1%.
employment may both increase or dramatically fall.
Figure 2 summarizes our main results. On the left, this figure plots how an increase
of 1% in the productivity of the automated technology, zK , changes employment, n,
when all firms draw productivity at the time of entry (λe = 1) and under different val-
ues of λn. Clearly, the probability that workers lose their comparative advantage and
are endogenously fired – controlled by λn – affects the response of employment to an
automation-augmenting shock (rise in zK). In the case of (very) low λn, our model
in this paper is very close to the model we used in Guimara˜es and Gil (2019). Conse-
quently, the results are quite similar in the two models: when λn is close to zero, man-
ual firms rarely automate the production of the tasks, and a rise in zK slightly increases
employment. If, however, we assume larger values of λn, an automation-augmenting
shock may lead to sizable losses in employment: if λn = 0.15,
14 manual firms are more
likely to automate the production of the tasks after the shock, and employment falls
2.5%, that is, two and a half times the magnitude of the shock to zK .
Shocks in the economy affect employment through changes in both job creation
and job destruction. Thus, to shed more light on the mechanisms in our model, we
decompose the two effects of an automation-augmenting shock of 1% on employment
on the right-hand side of Figure 2. In particular, we show how the job-finding prob-
ability, f(θ), (which indicates job creation) and the job-destruction probability, JD ≡
δL+(1−δL)λnG(z
∗), react to the automation-augmenting shock (also as a function of λn
and in the case of λe = 1). To understand how a rise in zK affects employment, let’s first
consider the extreme case of λn = 0. This case implies that tasks that start asmanual are
14λn = 0.15 implies that the tasks’ productivity is redrawn, on average, approximately every sixmonths.
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never automated: tasks have constant idiosyncratic productivity, z, meaning that work-
ers never lose their comparative advantage; thus, firms have no incentive to shift from
themanual to the automated technology in equilibrium. As a result, λn = 0 also implies
that job destruction is constant and unaffected by the automation-augmenting shock.
The same is not true for job creation. A rise in zK increases the value of the automated
technology, leading to a reallocation effect: some entering firms steer away from the
manual technology and invest instead in the automated technology (z∗e increases); for
a given number of entering firms, job creation shrinks. But an automation-augmenting
shock also increases the expected value of a firm, which incentivizes firm entry.15 The
free-entry condition, Eq. (4), is only satisfied if the value of the manual technology
drops, which occurs in ourmodel through higher wages and, most importantly, greater
labor market tightness. A tighter labor market is synonym of greater job-finding prob-
ability and, necessarily, higher job creation. Therefore, if λe = 1, the aggregate effect
of greater firm entry exceeds the reallocation effect implied by the increase in z∗e and,
thus, an automation-augmenting shock increases job creation.16 This, together with
the constant job destruction (λn = 0), increases employment.
If λn > 0, a rise in zK affects both job-finding and job-destruction probabilities.
As before, the job-finding probability increases because a rise in zK boosts entry more
than it boosts reallocation at the time of entry. Because firms are forward-looking, they
have an evenhigher incentive to create jobs and invest in themanual technology (when
λn > 0 than when λn = 0) in anticipation of the greater profits when they automate
production. But the job-destruction probability also increases: as machines are more
productive, firms that use the manual technology are motivated to shift to the auto-
mated one. This translates into a higher z∗, reducing the average time of a worker-firm
match. Because λn is the probability that the firm redraws the productivity of the task,
a higher λn increases the number ofmanual firms drawing low productivity (for a given
z∗), leading to even greater job destruction. If λn is large enough, then the increase in
job destruction surpasses the increase in job creation, implying less employment.17
The rise in zK may lead to greater employment even if we mute the channel in
Guimara˜es and Gil (2019) and set λe = 0. The bottom three lines of Table 2 show the
effects of higher zK on the employment, job-finding probability, and job-destruction
probability (besides output and the labor share) when λe = 0 and λn equals 0.01, 0.05,
15The expected value of a firm (prior to entry) surges because a higher zK directly increases the expected
value of the automated firms and, ceteris paribus, indirectly increases the expected value of manual firms.
The latter occurs because the productivity of the tasks produced with manual technology is heteroge-
neous and the firms drawing the least productive of these tasks prefer the automated technology when zK
increases (z∗e increases).
16The same mechanism can be found in Guimara˜es and Gil (2019) and relies on the assumption of an
undirected-technological search process as in Benhabib, Perla and Tonetti (2017).
17The increase in z∗ exacerbates the rise on the left-hand side of Eq. (4) as firms only destroy jobs if it is
more profitable for them (JL(z) increases for all z; see Eq. (1)). Thus, a higher increase in job destruction
must be accompanied by an even tighter labor market. But, as we will show in Section 4.1, λn affects job
destruction by more than job creation because the automation-augmenting shock increases wages and
the prevalence of matching frictions.
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or 0.15. To allow for a direct comparison, the top four lines of Table 2 show the same
experiments when λe = 1 (and we include the case of λn = 0 for completeness). If
λe = 0, all tasks demand labor when created, as in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), and
firms may only take advantage of the increased productivity if they automate the pro-
duction of the task. Thus, it is remarkable that an increase in zK – the productivity of
a technology that can only be used after a job is destroyed – is still capable of leading
to greater employment under a slightly positive λn (see the line regarding λe = 0 and
λn = 0.01 in Table 2). Indeed, in the case of λe = 0, an increase in zK continues to affect
both job creation and job destruction. First, it continues to promote greater firm entry
and job creation because of the increase in the value of the automated technology, as
an outside option of the firms using themanual technology. But different from the case
of λe > 0, if λe = 0, workers only benefit from larger firm entry because all firms start
as manual and must hire a worker. Second, an automation-augmenting shock implies
that firms have a higher opportunity cost of employing the worker and, thus, prefer to
shift earlier to the automated technology (z∗ increases). This increases job destruction.
If λn is low, the job-creation effect dominates; but if λn is large, the job-destruction
effect dominates.18
Our results show how our model may both agree and disagree with the empirical
findings in Autor and Salomons (2018) and Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn (2018). Un-
der some calibrations, job creation increases more than job destruction, agreeing with
their findings that employment increased after productivity enhancements in the past.
But under other calibrations, job destruction increasesmore than job creation and em-
ployment may significantly fall. Thus, this suggests that the future of employment may
differ from the past. Our model calls the attention specifically to λn, which we interpret
as a feature intrinsic to tasks that characterizes how rapidly workers lose their compar-
ative advantage. In an economy in which workers rapidly lose their comparative ad-
vantage (rapid-changing environments) and with matching frictions, employment falls
after an automation-augmenting shock. In this economy, jobs last for less periods and
18It is not possible to pin down analytically why this result obtains in the case of λe = 0. But there
are two aspects that offer a hint on why it happens. First, when λn is low, the weight of endogenous job
destruction on total job destruction, JD, is very low: a change in z∗ barely alters JD if λn is low. Yet, λn
does not change the elasticity of f(θ) with respect to θ. Second, if we use Eqs. (1) and (6) both measured
at z¯ and z∗ together with the firing cutoff equation, Eq. (2), and free-entry condition, Eq. (4), we obtain
κL
βµ(θ)
= (1− φ)
[
βJK − κK +
zL(z¯ − z
∗)
1− β(1− δL)(1− λn)
]
− Ω
(
1
β
− φ
)
.
To properly assess assess how z∗ and θ affect each other, we need another equation relating them. But
the equation above shows that the labor market becomes tighter when the productivity of the automated
technology goes up (JK increases). This is a direct effect that takes into account that without a change
in z∗, the increase in zK directly increases the value of the firm in the cases in which the task is already
automated. This naturally increases the value of a job and, thus, job creation. This equation also shows
that a rise in z∗ reduces θ (because jobs last for less periods) and that the elasticity of θ with respect to
z∗ increases with λn (we confirm this numerically given that zL and δL are used to reach our steady-state
targets). Thus, for a given change in θ, if λn is low, z
∗ cannot change much to satisfy this equation. Fur-
thermore, any change in z∗ has aminor effect on JD. But if λn is higher, z
∗ has to fluctuatemore to satisfy
this equation and has a larger impact on JD, shifting the ranking of the forces at play.
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Table 2: The effect of an increase of 1% in zK
λe λn ∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD
1 0 0.87 -0.52 0.17 0.76 0.00
1 0.01 1.04 -0.70 0.12 0.76 0.19
1 0.05 2.01 -1.85 -0.20 0.82 1.73
1 0.15 7.00 -8.26 -2.49 1.25 13.00
0 0.01 0.11 -0.06 0.01 0.19 0.15
0 0.05 0.56 -0.58 -0.20 0.55 1.45
0 0.15 2.74 -4.34 -2.20 0.97 11.30
Note: This table shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock under various combinations of
the probability that the task’s productivity is drawn at the time of entry, λe, and the probability that it
is redrawn afterwards, λn. The first two columns show the calibration of these two probabilities. The
next five columns show the percentage change in the output, labor share, employment, job-finding
probability, and job-destruction probability. The shock to zK is of 1%.
the increase in labor market tightness makes it more costly to hire the right worker for
the task and allows workers to enjoy greater wages. These effects prevent job creation
from keeping pace with job destruction. Therefore, if the nature of the new and current
jobs is different from the past – particularly, if tasks feature a higher λn in the future
than in the past and, thus, tasks rapidly become liable to be automated – the same pro-
ductivity shock of the pastmay have dramatically different consequences in the future.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we assess how different calibrations of our model change the outcomes
of an automation-augmenting shock of 1%. We consider eight experiments, and in each
experiment we recalibrate one parameter (or target) of the model. We conclude that
none of the experiments changes the qualitative predictions of our model. In all cases,
both job creation and job destruction increase after an automation-augmenting shock
(except in the case of λn = 0, in which case the job-destruction probability is constant
by assumption). And the change in the job-destruction probability is still more sensi-
tive toλn than the change in the job-finding probability. This implies a negative relation
between the change in employment after the rise in zK and λn: if λn is low, employment
increases; on the contrary, if λn is high, employment falls.
Our experiments do, however, change the results quantitatively. And among our
eight experiments, two have particularly large quantitative effects that we show in Pan-
els B and C of Table 3. These two panels show how a rise in zK affects employment,
job-finding probability, and job-destruction probability in economies with z¯ = 0.225
(instead of z¯ = 0.25) and with a Pareto distribution of productivity draws (instead of a
uniform distribution), respectively. As in Table 2, we consider various combinations of
λn and λe. And to ease comparability with the results of our model using the baseline
calibration (reported in Table 2), we reproduce those results in Panel A of Table 3.
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Table 3: The effect of an increase of 1% in zK – Sensitivity Analysis
A: Baseline B: z¯ = 0.225 C: Pareto D: η = 0.4
λe λn ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD
1 0 0.17 0.76 0.00 0.19 0.87 0.00 0.31 1.41 0.00 0.21 0.95 0.00
1 0.01 0.12 0.76 0.19 0.13 0.86 0.25 0.21 1.21 0.24 0.17 0.95 0.19
1 0.05 -0.20 0.82 1.73 -0.29 0.93 2.28 -0.51 1.28 3.66 -0.16 1.04 1.78
1 0.15 -2.49 1.25 13.00 -3.23 1.51 16.89 -6.62 2.82 35.97 -2.49 1.58 13.37
0 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.34 0.21 -0.00 0.13 0.14 0.02 0.24 0.15
0 0.05 -0.20 0.55 1.45 -0.27 0.69 1.93 -0.35 0.73 2.32 -0.17 0.69 1.47
0 0.15 -2.20 0.97 11.30 -2.83 1.18 14.57 -5.08 2.05 26.87 -2.19 1.22 11.53
Note: This table shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock under various combinations
of the probability that the task’s productivity is drawn at the time of entry, λe, and the probability that
it is redrawn afterwards, λn. The first two columns show the calibration of these two probabilities.
The next columns show the percentage change in the employment, job-finding probability, and job-
destruction probability under a slightly different calibration in each panel. The shock to zK is of 1%.
Panel A presents the baseline results; Panel B presents the results assuming a lower maximum produc-
tivity draw; Panel C presents the results assuming a Pareto distribution of productivity draws; Panel D
presents the results assuming a lower elasticity of the matching function.
Economies with a tighter range of productivity draws (low z¯ or high zmin) experi-
ence larger changes in the flows after the rise in zK and also tend to experience larger
changes in employment than in our baseline economy. We also find a similar result in
the case of the Pareto distribution. If the cumulative distribution of productivity draws
is of the form G(z) = 1 −
(
zmin
z
)ξ
, a higher ξ (which concentrates productivity draws
near the minimum) increases the effects of the shock.19 The intuition is simple. If we
reduce z¯ or increase ξ, the distribution of productivity draws becomes more concen-
trated and, thus, the same change in z∗ and z∗e alters the optimal decision of a larger
proportion of firms. In these circumstances, the same rise in zK amplifies the required
change in labor market tightness, θ, to balance the free-entry condition, Eq. (4), and –
most importantly –motivates amuch larger proportion ofmanual firms to destroy jobs
and automate the production of the tasks. Therefore, these experiments paint an even
bleaker picture than our baseline: depending on the calibration, the fall in employment
after the shock can be as catastrophic as 6.5-fold the magnitude of the shock.
In Panel D of Table 3, we consider the case of a smaller matching function elasticity,
η = 0.4 (instead of η = 0.5). We consider this case as it reduces the elasticity of the hir-
ing costs, κL
µ(θ) =
κLθ
η
χ
, relative to labor market tightness, θ. As a result, we would expect
greater flows in the labor market, particularly for job creation, to balance the free-entry
condition, Eq. (4). We show that this does occur but the final impact of reducing η on
employment is whimsy because it also magnifies job destruction.20 Finally, we con-
sider the cases of a higher cost of capital, κK , lower workers’ bargaining power, φ, lower
19In Panel C of Table 3, we assume that ξ = 5. In all our experiments with the Pareto distribution, we
continue assuming that firms that do not draw productivity at the time of entry start with productivity z¯.
20In Section 4.1, we explain that the good effects of a lower η on job creation also promote higher wages,
which motivate firms to destroy jobs and automate the production of the tasks.
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proportion of firms that draw productivity below the entry cutoff, G(z∗e ), higher job-
filling costs, κL, and higher matching efficiency, χ. The results of these experiments are
detailed in Tables A1 and A2, which we relegate to the Appendix A as they barely affect
the results of our model.
3.4 Output and Labor Share
Although our focus in this paper is on the effects of automation-augmenting shocks on
employment, we can use our model to gather insights about the effect of these shocks
on output and the labor share. Table 2 shows that an automation-augmenting shock in-
creases output and reduces the labor share and that λn amplifies both changes. Thus,
the scenarios in which employment falls coincide with an even larger increase in out-
put and fall in the labor share. Wefind that these results follow frommainly four factors.
First, the automation-augmenting shock directly increases output and directly reduces
the relative contribution of labor for output. Second, firm entry is amplified by λn:
higher λn increases the probability that the firm will take advantage of the higher pro-
ductivity in the automated technology, increasing the incentives for firm entry, which
markedly increases output. Third, this increased entry is more concentrated on firms
that use the automated technology, lowering the labor share. And fourth, a higher λn
incentivizes firms to fire workers and destroy jobs, also dropping the labor share.
The fact that our model is able to simultaneously reduce the labor share and in-
crease employment is particularly important as this is the pattern observed in most
developed countries. Using data for these countries, Autor and Salomons (2018) docu-
ment that TFP shocks have been employment-augmenting but labor-share displacing.
In the literature, most of the models that are able to explain the fall in the labor share
predict lower employment (e.g., Caballero andHammour, 1998; Zeira, 1998; Hornstein,
Krusell and Violante, 2007; Prettner and Strulik (2017); Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018).
To the best of our knowledge, until now, only our previous model in Guimara˜es and Gil
(2019) was able to account for the two patterns (lower labor share and increased em-
ployment) simultaneously after only one shock. Yet, our previous model robustly pre-
dicts an increase in employment after an automation-augmenting shock, which pre-
vents it from giving insights about how the future may differ from the past. Our model
in Section 2 is also consistent with the documented patterns in Autor and Salomons
but is flexible enough to provide scenarios in which different outcomes may arise from
the same sort of shocks.
4 Dissecting theMechanism
4.1 Ad hoc Function for Wages
Our baseline model shows that after an automation-augmenting shock, employment
increases if λn is low and falls if λn is large. We find that both job creation and job de-
struction increase after a rise in zK (unless λn = 0, in which case the job destruction
rate is fixed). But, the change in the job-destruction rate increases much more with λn
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than the change in the job-finding rate. One factor thatmay explain this behavior is the
wage response. In all our calibrations, wages increase due to the rise in the job-finding
probability and in the value of themanual firm (which increases namely due to a better
outside option to move to the automated technology). Yet, the worker’s productivity
remains unchanged, implying that the rise in zK squeezes the operational profits in the
manual technology. So we ask: if wages were only a function of the task’s productivity,
how would the job-creation and job-destruction margins react to an increase in zK?
To answer this question, we build a new version of the model in which we replace
Nash bargaining with an ad hoc functional form for wages: w(z) = (1 − φnb)b + φnbzLz
(0 < φnb < 1). Wages are the weighted sum of a constant term and the tasks’ produc-
tivity. In this case, the improvement in the worker’s and firm’s outside option have no
effect on the wage. Importantly, a rise in zK has no effect on wages.
Panel B of Table 4 shows how employment, job-finding probability (indicator of
job creation), and job-destruction probability change after an automation-augmenting
shock of 1% under various combinations of λe and λn.
21 For convenience, Panel A of the
same table reproduces the results for the same experiments using our baseline model
of Section 2. The main takeaway from Panel B is that employment increases for all the
combinations we consider of λe and λn, which is in stark contrast with the results re-
ported in Panel A. By further contrasting Panels A andB, we see that the job-finding rate
increases muchmore while the job-destruction rate increases less in this version of the
model than in the baseline one. Thus, if wages are orthogonal to zK and θ, firms have a
much greater incentive to hire a worker as their operational profits remain unchanged.
Furthermore, and by the same token, firms have less incentives to fire the worker and
move to the automated technology.
Panel B of Table 4 also shows that the change in the job-destruction rate contin-
ues to increase much more with λn than the change in the job-finding rate. The net
effect is that the change in employment tends to be negatively related with λn, which
suggests that for sufficiently high λn, employment may still drop after an automation-
augmenting shock. We confirm this in parallel experiments: employment falls if λe = 1
andλn ≥ 0.26, aswell as if λe = 0 andλn ≥ 0.23, because job destruction increasesmore
than job creation after the rise in zK . It is natural that the job destruction rate increases
with λn as this rate becomes more sensitive to endogenous factors. Yet, at first sight, it
is unclear why the job-finding probability increases less than the job-destruction prob-
ability given that there are also greater incentives to create new tasks and jobs if λn is
high.
We conjecture that matching frictions are behind this pattern. As the labor market
tightness, θ, increases, the costs of a firm to match with a worker also increase, reduc-
ing incentives for job creation. We can test this conjecture by checking how our results
21To calibrate the model with the ad hoc wage, we start by determining zL and b using our baseline
model under each calibration. Once determined zL and b, we obtain φnb together with zK , Ω, and δL to
reach our targets for the employment rate, labor share, job-destruction rate, andG(z∗e ).
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Table 4: The effect of an increase of 1% in zK – Model comparison
A: Baseline B: Ad hoc wage C: Low friction D: CES (ǫ = 5)
λe λn ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD
1 0 0.17 0.76 0.00 1.53 7.36 0.00 0.19 0.76 0.00 0.13 0.59 0.00
1 0.01 0.12 0.76 0.19 1.50 7.37 0.17 0.15 0.76 0.18 0.10 0.57 0.11
1 0.05 -0.20 0.82 1.73 1.36 7.94 1.38 -0.16 0.87 1.69 -0.04 0.54 0.71
1 0.15 -2.49 1.25 13.00 0.71 12.82 9.21 -2.28 1.49 12.49 -0.25 0.54 1.66
0 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.40 2.02 0.18 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.16 0.10
0 0.05 -0.20 0.55 1.45 1.04 6.46 1.46 -0.17 0.58 1.44 -0.08 0.44 0.78
0 0.15 -2.20 0.97 11.30 0.51 11.99 9.42 -2.05 1.17 10.96 -0.34 0.52 2.07
Note: This table shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock under various combinations
of the probability that the task’s productivity is drawn at the time of entry, λe, and the probability that
it is redrawn afterwards, λn. The first two columns show the calibration of these two probabilities.
The next columns, divided in four panels, show the percentage change in the employment, job-finding
probability, and job-destruction probability. In each panel, we use a different version of our model.
The shock to zK is of 1%.
change with different calibrations of thematching function elasticity, η. If η is low, then
the costs of a firm to match with a worker are less sensitive to the labor market tight-
ness ( κL
µ(θ) =
κLθ
η
χ
). Thus, matching frictions are less relevant for job creation and we
should observe greater job creation after an automation-augmenting shock. Using our
baseline model, in Section 3.3, we concluded that η barely affects how employment re-
acts to the increase in zK . Yet, Figure 3 shows a different result if we use our model
with the ad hoc wage equation; in fact, it confirms our conjecture that matching fric-
tions prevent a greater increase in employment. This figure plots how the job-finding
and job-destruction rates change after the automation-augmenting shock for a range
of values of λn and using our model with the ad hoc wage equation. On both panels,
λe = 1. The difference between the panels lies only in the value of η: the left-panel
assumes η = 0.4; the right-panel assumes η = 0.5. Confirming our conjecture, job cre-
ation increases much more after the rise in zK if η = 0.4 than if η = 0.5. Interestingly,
η barely affects the change in job destruction. Thus, employment reacts more after an
automation-augmenting shock if η = 0.4. But why are the results so different when
we use Nash bargaining and when we use our ad hoc equation? The reason seems to
lie in the outside option of workers, U . If the job-filling probability, µ(θ) = χθ−η, is
less sensitive to changes in labor market tightness, θ, then the job-finding probability,
f(θ) = χθ1−η, is more sensitive. Thus, given that U and f(θ) are positively related (see
Eq. 7), ceteris paribus a lower η increases the elasticity of U relative to θ, allowing all
workers to demand greater wages. Our ad hoc wage, however, prevents the operational
profit of manual firms to be affected by U , leading to the different results.
Our experiments with themodel assuming the ad hoc equation work as counterfac-
tuals to understand the dynamics in our original model. But these experiments do not
seem to be a good account of how an automation-augmenting shock is likely to unfold
in the future. Unless the historical positive relationship between labor market tight-
ness and wage increments definitely breaks in the future, the automation-augmenting
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Figure 3: The effect of higher zK under λe = 1 and different values of λn and η
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Note: This figure shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock using our model with the ad
hoc wage equation. In both panels, we assume that all firms draw the tasks’ productivity at the time of
entry, λe = 1, and different probabilities that this productivity is redrawn afterwards, λn. Both panels
show the percentage change in the job-finding probability and in the job-destruction probability. In
Panel A, η = 0.4; in panel B, η = 0.5. The shock to zK is of 1%.
shockwill increase wages, whichmay promote the sizable negative employment effects
that we obtain using our baseline model.
4.2 Lower Frictions
Our baseline model suggests that, as λn increases, it becomes easier to fire a worker
than to hire a worker due to matching frictions, because the latter increase wages and
the costs to find a suitable worker. Matching frictions in our model come from the
matching function but also come from our assumption that workers who lose jobs stay
unemployed for at least a period (month). Although this is a typical assumption in
models with matching frictions and finds support in the evidence (Hall and Kudlyak,
2019), we can argue that in an economy that experiences a surge in labor market flows,
this assumption may be too restrictive. In such an economy, it is likely that workers
find jobs even within a month from losing them and start production immediately.22
Relaxing this assumption may be important in our model: in an economy that experi-
ences a surge in job destruction, the pool of available workers to match with firms may
become too narrow, raising the relevance of matching frictions. Thus, we ask: what are
the predictions of our model if workers can look for jobs and start production immedi-
ately after losing their jobs?
22Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2016) make a similar assumption. They build a model with
matching frictions but calibrate each period as a quarter, whereas tipically these models are calibrated
with monthly data. Because in US data many workers find jobs and start production within a quarter, it
would be too restrictive to assume that workers who lose jobs need to wait for the quarter to end to restart
production. In our case, the probability to find jobsmay increase somuch that it can be equally restrictive.
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Panel C of Table 4 answers this question and, by contrasting the results in this panel
with those in Panel A, confirms our prediction. In an economy that experiences an
automation-augmenting shock and in which workers who lose jobs can look for other
jobs and restart production immediately, matching frictions become less relevant and
the job-finding probability increases more with λn. The implication of this is that em-
ployment becomes less negatively correlated with λn; yet, and even though this model
also generates a smaller increase in the job destruction rate than the baseline, the change
in employment continues to fall significantly with λn.
The lack of firepower of this experiment is not completely surprising. First, our sen-
sitivity analysis with η in Section 3.3 shows that our results are not much sensitive to
the calibration of the matching function. This suggests that the degree of matching
frictions are not much quantitatively relevant in our model.23 Second, the change in
the pool of nonemployed workers imposed by the rise in the job-destruction rate is not
so great. Even in the case of λe = 1 and λn = 0.15, the rise in the job-destruction rate
displaces only an additional 0.0037 proportion of the workforce per period. Given our
steady-state target of nonemployment of 1 − n = 0.22, the number of workers looking
for jobs is not much affected.
4.3 CES Aggregator
In our baselinemodel, we assume that the tasks produced by workers and bymachines
are perfect substitutes. In this section, we instead build a model assuming that – from
the perspective of consumers – they are imperfect substitutes. Our motivation for this
setup is to take into account that consumers may deem differently a task produced
by a machine or by a worker, a factor that we call human touch. For example, both a
vendingmachine and a seller sell goods and, thus, they broadly perform the same task.
Nonetheless, consumers may value the task differently on the basis of who is perform-
ing it. The worker (seller) can offer a more personal (human touch) to the task whereas
the machine (vending machine) offers an impersonal service. This naturally renders
machine and worker imperfect substitutes, from the perspective of the consumer. An
ubiquitous use of the automated technology may, then, change the relative price of
the tasks produced by machines and workers as consumers look for the differentiated
offer of the manual technology. Our goal, then, is to assess how the presence of the hu-
man touch (imperfect substitutability) affects the wrestle between the job-finding and
job-destruction margins in determining how an automation-augmenting shock affects
employment. In particular, can this setup reverse our prediction that economies with
high λn experience lower employment after an automation-augmenting shock? Or are
there any relevant quantitative implications?
We implement this model by assuming a CES aggregator of the outputs of the tasks
produced by automated and manual technologies, where y is an index of final con-
23This follows from the fact that the wage increases with the automation-augmenting shock (see the
discussion in Section 4.1) and the remaining parameters adjust to balance the steady-state of our model
and reach our steady-state targets.
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sumption (i.e., a bundle of goods and services demanded by consumers). In this setup,
the elasticity of substitution is ǫ, and this model nests our baseline model if ǫ = ∞. In
particular, the CES takes the following form:
y =
[
y
ǫ−1
ǫ
K + y
ǫ−1
ǫ
L
] ǫ
ǫ−1
, (17)
where yK and yL are the sum of the outputs produced using each type of technology:
yK = zKnK ,
yL = zL
[
(n− n∗ − n∗e)z¯ + n
∗
e
1
1−G(z∗e )
∫ z¯
z∗e
zdG(z) + n∗
1
G(z∗e )−G(z
∗)
∫ z∗e
z∗
zdG(z).
]
Assuming competitivemarkets in the intermediate goods yK and yL anda profit-maximizing
final-good producer, we get:
pK = y
−
1
ǫ
K y
1
ǫ , (18)
pL = y
−
1
ǫ
L y
1
ǫ . (19)
Thus, a rise in zK leads to an increase in yK , which reduces the price of the tasks pro-
duced using the automated technology. Furthermore, it also leads to a rise in y, which
converts into a higher price of the tasks produced using the manual technology. These
two effects clearly affect the motivation to create jobs as well as to fire workers and au-
tomate the production of tasks (destroy jobs).
Panel D of Table 4 shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock in the
model with the CES assuming ǫ = 5 and under the various combinations of λe and
λn. Assuming that the outputs of the two technologies are imperfect substitutes does
not change our results qualitatively. In economies with high λn, employment still falls.
Yet, our setup with a CES affects the results quantitatively: it reduces the elasticities in
themodel because the total impact of the shock, pKzK , is lower reflecting the fall in the
price of the automated good, pK , after the rise in zK .
One interesting outcome reported in Panel D of Table 4 is that our setup with the
CES constrains job destruction much more than job creation. To shed light on this, on
the left panel of Figure 4, we plot how the job-destruction probability, JD, and job-
finding probability, f(θ), change with the elasticity of substitution, ǫ, under the case of
λe = 1 and λn = 0.15. On the right-hand side of the same figure, we plot the prices
of the tasks produced by each type of technology also as a function of ǫ. The shock is,
as usual, an automation-augmenting shock of 1%. Undoubtedly, the job-destruction
margin is muchmore affected by the elasticity of substitution to the point that the shift
of the two margins almost converges if ǫ = 2. (Recall that in the baseline, ǫ = ∞, the
job-finding probability increases 1.32% and the job-destruction probability increases
13.11%). There are two aspects that can explain this. First, an automation-augmenting
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Figure 4: The effect of higher zK under λe = 1, λn = 0.15, and different values of ǫ
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Note: This figure shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock using our model with the CES
aggregator. To produce these results, we assume that all firms draw the tasks’ productivity at the time
of entry, λe = 1, and that on average about every six months this productivity is redrawn afterwards,
λn = 0.15. The left-panel shows the percentage change in the job-finding probability and in the job-
destruction probability. The right-panel shows the percentage change in the price of tasks produced
using the manual technology and in the price of the tasks produced using the automated technology.
The shock to zK is of 1%.
shock reduces pK and, thus, curbs down the increase in machines’ productivity, pKzK .
This naturally reduces the incentives to destroy jobs and automate tasks after the rise
in zK . It also reduces the incentives to create jobs as the shock has a lower impact on
the value of firms. Yet, the same automation-augmenting shock increases pL and, thus,
increases workers’ productivity, pLzLz. This balances the effect (of lower pKzK) on job
creation but further reduces the motivation to destroy jobs and automate tasks. As we
increase ǫ, the fall in pK and the rise in pL become smaller; thus, the incentives to au-
tomate and destroy jobs increase significantly while job creation changes much less as
the effects of the two prices tend to almost balance out.
These mechanisms help explain why in calibrations with high λn (keeping ǫ fixed),
the assumption of imperfect-substitutability between the two outputs, yK and yL, (re-
sults reported in Panel D of Table 4) affects job-destruction much more than job cre-
ation. Economies with high λn experience greater reallocation from the manual to the
automated technology after an automation-augmenting shock. Greater reallocation
then implies a greater rise in the number of firms using the automated technology, nK ,
and, thus, in the output produced using the automated technology, yK . In this setup
with the CES, the greater rise in yK further drops pK and further increases pL, leading
to lower incentives to fire workers and, thus, a greater drop in job destruction when
contrasted with the baseline results. The two effects of pK and pL tend to balance the
change in job creation, leading to the smaller relative drop in job creation when com-
pared with the baseline.
These experiments with the CES aggregator show that consumers have an impor-
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tant role in determining the effects of automation-augmenting shocks on employment.
If a large proportion of the tasks are directed to consumers, their preference for the hu-
man touchmay severely reduce the negative effects of automation-augmenting shocks
on employment.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we build a model to assess how an automation-augmenting shock – a
generalized increase in theproductivity ofmachines/robots – affects employment. This
model relies onmultiple previous contributions (Mortensen andPissarides, 1994; Horn-
stein, Krusell and Violante, 2007; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018; and Guimara˜es and
Gil, 2019) to satisfy two criteria. First, it is consistent with the past documented by Au-
tor and Salomons (2018) and Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn (2018): an automation-
augmenting shock can simultaneously reduce the labor share and increase employ-
ment. Second, our model is flexible enough to offer insights on how the future may
differ from the past: depending on the calibration, an automation-augmenting shock
may increase or decrease employment.
In our model, an automation-augmenting shock enlarges labor market flows. On
the one hand, it promotes greater job destruction because the automated technology
(that only uses robots) becomesmore attractive than themanual technology (that only
uses labor). On the other hand, due to either a sort of complementarity at the time of
entry (as in Guimara˜es and Gil, 2019) or because hiring a worker is a crucial first step
in starting the production of a task (as in Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018), firm entry
and job creation also increase. Yet, this robust increase in labor market flows predicted
by our model contrasts with US data showing a downward trend in flows for the last
decades (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014). This documented trend is even more relevant
given that the fall in labor market flows occurred in a period of increased automation
and investment in robots (Prettner and Strulik, 2017; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019a,
Guimara˜es and Gil, 2019). But a closer look into the changes in labor market flows
across US sectors reveals that, even though labor market flows fell in all sectors, they
fell unevenly across them. Particularly, Decker et al. (2014) document that labormarket
flows fell much more in retail and services sectors than in finance and manufacturing
sectors – the sectors that arguably were more susceptible to automation. We can inter-
pret these patterns in light of two trends: a general trend reducing labor market flows
in all sectors (e.g., demographics as argued by Engbom, 2019) and a trend increasing
labor market flows in some sectors (with greater pervasiveness of automation). Our
model abstracts from the general trend and only takes into account the positive contri-
bution of automation-augmenting shocks to labor market flows.
Using ourmodel, we sort the cases inwhich employment increases after an automation-
augmenting shock and those in which it falls. In environments in which the compar-
ative advantage of workers in producing a task is relatively stable – slow-changing en-
vironments – the increase in job creation dominates the increase in job destruction.
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Therefore, in slow-changing environments, employment increases. On the contrary,
in environments in which the comparative advantage of workers changes frequently
– rapid-changing environments – an automation-augmenting shock leads to massive
job destruction that clearly offsets the increase in job creation. In these environments,
employment catastrophically falls.
We also find that the fall in employment in rapid-changing environments crucially
depends on the relevance and prevalence of what we call human touch. Human touch
refers to a consumers’ preference for diversity in the producer/provider of the task it-
self: in a world with widespread usage of machines to offer multiple services to con-
sumers, they may value the differentiated service of a human. If that is the case, an
automation-augmenting shock (and ensuing spread of usage of machines/robots) in-
creases the price of the tasks produced by workers relative to those produced by the
machines/robots. This curtails job destruction, reducing the fall in employment.
Our paper then clarifies how the future may differ from the past. If the compara-
tive advantage of workers in producing new tasks starts to vanish more rapidly than
in the past, then automation-augmenting shocks will curb down employment rather
than increase it. The extent of this fall will naturally depend on demand and, partic-
ularly, consumers’ preferences. If many of the tasks produced in an economy are sold
directly to consumers and they have a preference for the human touch, then the fall
in employment will unlikely be catastrophic. But if most of the tasks are part of a vast
value chain to produce a final good or if consumers have no preference for the human
touch, then the fall in employment in the future may be catastrophic.
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A Further robustness checks
Table A1: The effect of an increase of 1% in zK – Sensitivity Analysis
A: Baseline B: κK = 0.1 C: φ = 0.4 D:G(z
∗
e ) = 0.4
λe λn ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD
1 0 0.17 0.76 0.00 0.16 0.75 0.00 0.16 0.71 0.00 0.22 1.02 0.00
1 0.01 0.12 0.76 0.19 0.12 0.75 0.20 0.12 0.72 0.18 0.17 0.95 0.18
1 0.05 -0.20 0.82 1.73 -0.22 0.83 1.84 -0.18 0.81 1.65 -0.16 0.94 1.70
1 0.15 -2.49 1.25 13.00 -2.62 1.27 13.64 -2.38 1.31 12.54 -2.40 1.42 12.75
0 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.20 0.16 0.01 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.13
0 0.05 -0.20 0.55 1.45 -0.21 0.56 1.51 -0.19 0.53 1.41 -0.18 0.59 1.41
0 0.15 -2.20 0.97 11.30 -2.26 0.97 11.59 -2.14 0.99 11.02 -2.16 1.11 11.23
Note: This table shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock under various combinations
of the probability that the task’s productivity is drawn at the time of entry, λe, and the probability
that it is redrawn afterwards, λn. The first two columns show the calibration of these two probabili-
ties. The next columns show the percentage change in the employment, job-finding probability, and
job-destruction probability under a slightly different calibration in each panel. The shock to zK is of
1%. Panel A presents the baseline results; Panel B presents the results assuming a higher cost of capi-
tal/robot; Panel C presents the results assuming a lower workers’ bargaining power; Panel D presents
the results assuming a lower proportion of productivity draws below the entry cutoff.
Table A2: The effect of an increase of 1% in zK – Sensitivity Analysis
A: Baseline B: κL = 0.1 C: χ = 0.2
λe λn ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD ∆n ∆f(θ) ∆JD
1 0 0.17 0.76 0.00 0.17 0.76 0.00 0.17 0.76 0.00
1 0.01 0.12 0.76 0.19 0.13 0.76 0.19 0.12 0.76 0.19
1 0.05 -0.20 0.82 1.73 -0.20 0.82 1.72 -0.20 0.82 1.77
1 0.15 -2.49 1.25 13.00 -2.48 1.25 12.93 -2.53 1.25 13.20
0 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.19 0.15
0 0.05 -0.20 0.55 1.45 -0.19 0.55 1.44 -0.20 0.56 1.47
0 0.15 -2.20 0.97 11.30 -2.19 0.97 11.27 -2.22 0.97 11.39
Note: This table shows the effects of an automation-augmenting shock under various combinations
of the probability that the task’s productivity is drawn at the time of entry, λe, and the probability that
it is redrawn afterwards, λn. The first two columns show the calibration of these two probabilities.
The next columns show the percentage change in the employment, job-finding probability, and job-
destruction probability under a slightly different calibration in each panel. The shock to zK is of 1%.
Panel A presents the baseline results; Panel B presents the results assuming higher job-filling costs;
Panel C presents the results assuming a higher matching efficiency.
